Washington Law Review
Volume 30
Number 2 Washington Case Law-1954
5-1-1955

Constitutional Law
Samuel F. Pearce

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Samuel F. Pearce, Washington Case Law, Constitutional Law, 30 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 87 (1955).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol30/iss2/2

This Washington Case Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

19551

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954

lake and back, made partly for the purpose of test-sighting the rifle, was
within the course and scope of the employee's employment. If this inference is reasonable, then the question of agency relationship in the
Barnett case was for the jury and not for the court to decide.'
Also, if the inference is reasonable, then was the presumption of
agency arising initially in the Barnett case overcome by clear and convincing countervailing evidence? Most of defendant's countervailing
evidence was introduced to indicate the employee's trip to the lake was
merely a family outing. Nevertheless, it was clearly apparent that
another purpose, a business one, was to test-sight a deer rifle. As has
been shown, the fact that an act has a dual purpose, one being private,
will not prevent its being held within-the actor's scope of employment.
Even if the presumption of agency was held to have been overcome,
the inference of agency, from he nature of the employee's employment
and the purpose for which the lake trip was made, remained, which
normally would be sufficient to take the case to the jury. In the Barnett
case the court speaks of its "liberal" policy of sustaining decisions in
cases of this type. Probably the case stands best for the conservative
view that liability should not be extended to an employer for the negligent act of his employee where the relationship between the act and the
scope of the employment is at best remote or indirect.
WLIAM D. CA=RON
Broker's Right to a Commission. Feeley ,. Mullikin, 44 Wn.2d 680, 269 P.2d 828
(1954), was an action by a broker for a commission on the sale of an apartment house
lease and furnishings. The defendants had sold the property to a purchaser procured by
plaintiff, consumating the sale through a second broker to whom a commission was
paid. The second broker aided in financing the purchase, an opportunity the plaintiff
was not given. The trial court found for plaintiff on grounds that defendant's action
constituted bad faith, and thereby could not defeat plaintiff's right to a commission.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that since plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to consumate the sale, he was, as between him and defendants, the procuring
cause of the sale and thus entitled to a commission.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Right to Counsel and Due Process in Criminal Cases. The Washington court has held in a six to three decision that there was no denial
of the right to counsel and due process where the defendant went to trial
for incest two days after pleading and five days after arrest, the defendant and his court-appointed counsel having agreed to the early
17 See Buckley v. Harkens, 114 Wash. 468, 195 Pac. 250 (1921) ; Smith v. Eldridge
Motors, supra note 15; Carmin v. Port of Seattle, supra note 9.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[MAY

trial. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. As stated by the dissent in the case, Buckingkam v. Cranor,' "the
petitioner ran the gamut from freedom to life imprisonment in the
period from sometime Wednesday until sometime the following Monday." 2 The defendant, seeking habeas corpus, grounded his petition on
the contentions that his counsel was inexperienced and incompetent and
that the early trial date foreclosed proper preparation for defense.
The Washington constitution assures the accused the right to counsel' and that assurance is reaffirmed in the decisions.4 The right to counsel in Federal criminal proceedings is guaranteed in the Federal constitution' and similar provision is made in the Federal rules.' Where the
laws of a state afford no such guarantee the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not completely fill the gap so as to make
the right absolute The right to counsel carries with it the corollary
1 145 Wash. Dec. 107, 273 P2d 495 (1954), cert. denied ........ U.S .......... 75 Sup. Ct.
360 (1955).
2 145 Wash. Dec. at 113, 273 P2d at 497.
3Art. I, §3 contains the general due process clause. Art. I, §22 guarantees the
accused the right to counsel in any criminal proceeding. Note also the statutory provisions. RCW'10.01.110, 10.40.030, 10.46.050.
4 State v. Hartwig, 36 Wn2d 598, 219 P2d 564 (1950); Rauch v. Chapman, 16
Wash. 568, 48 Pac. 253 (1897) ; It re Gensburg, 35 Wn.2d 849, 215 P2d 880 (1950).
5 "In all criminal proceedings the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
assistance
6
FED. R. CRIm. P. 44.
7 A distinction is apparently made between the capital felony and non-capital case.
Right to counsel in a capital case is, except in unusual circumstances, an essential
element of due process. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). But cf. Quicksall v.
Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1949) (the Court affirmed a first degree murder conviction
where the defendant had pleaded guilty, saying there was no indication in the record
that he did not know his rights and no evidence that he had requested counsel).
In non-capital cases the Supreme Court recognizes the right to counsel where there
are special circumstances. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 445 (1942) (robbery conviction of
indigent defendant was upheld even though his request for counsel was denied; the
defendant was an intelligent adult and the indictment clearly stated the charges; the
Court said the existence of the right in proceedings before state courts was a matter
for the states to decide, the Sixth Amendment not being read into the Fourteenth
Amendment) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1949) (the approach to the problem was
the same as in the Betts case where the defendant was 57 years of age and the indictment was unambiguous); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (the Court found
denial of due process where the defendant, deceived by police officers, had pleaded
guilty of robbery without counsel; he had a history of mental disorder; this appeal
was 18 years after his hearing). The factors determining the necessity of the assistance
of counsel as matter of due process in a state prosecution include the gravity of the
offense, White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945), the complexity of the issues involved,
see Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 76 (1945), and the age, former trial experience and general
intelligence of the defendant, DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) ; Uveges
v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) ; Gryer v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948). It has
been suggested that the Supreme Court position that a fair trial can be conducted and
justice accorded the defendant without assistance of counsel does not reflect settled
historical concepts. Beck and Heidelbaugh, 7he Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,

An Inquiry Into the History and Practice in England and America, 28 NoaE DAmE

351 (1953). Another author observes that "the weight of the Court's opinions
leads to the conclusion that there is no absolute right to counsel nor any definite criteria
by which the Court determines whether the denial of the right resulted in deprivation
LAw.
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that the counsel must be competent though the standard of competency
is not well defined.' In one oft-cited case Judge Minton said that "the
services of counsel meet the requirements of the due process clause
when he is a member in good standing at the bar, gives his client his
complete loyalty, serves him in good faith to the best of his ability and
his service is of such character as to preserve the essential integrity of
the proceeding as a trial in a court of justice . . . His client is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one."9 Application of this test might
lead to less conflicting results than the usual broad standard of "fair
trial" or "due process."1 Adequate time for the preparation of a defense constitutes another corollary to the right. 1 The effectiveness of
of liberty without due process." WooD, DuE PRocESs

OF

LAw 217 (1951). See also

CORwIN, THE CONSITUnON AND WHAT IT MEAs TODAY 247 (1953).
8

There is an indication that Washington might give consideration to the argument
that court-appointed counsel was incompetent. State v. Kelch, 95 Wash. 277, 163 Pac.
757 (1917) (the argument was dismissed on the ground that the appointed attorneys
had been admitted to the bar several years prior to the trial, the court presuming such
experience to be equated with competence). But the majority in the instant case said:
"We are convinced the petitioner's actions were taken competently, intelligently and
voluntarily. His counsel acted under his directions which, on occasion, were against
the advice and judgment of the attorney. Regardless of the competency and experience
of counsel, his acts were those of the petitioner, and having limited his attorney's
actions, he cannot well complain now that those acts were incompetently done." 145
Wash. Dec. at 109, 273 P.2d at 495. See Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942);
Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414, 421-422 (S.D. Ga. 1942).
Just how much mishandling of the case amounts to incompetence is not easy to
determine. State v. Bourse, ........ Ore......... , 264 P.2d 800 (1953) (the appellate court
reversed a murder conviction where two inexperienced court-appointed counsel had
failed to make timely objection to inadmissible prejudicial evidence) ; Johnson v. U.S.,
110 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (new trial awarded where court-appointed counsel had
failed to examine an inquest transcript and to file an appeal brief on time); U.S.
ex rel. Hamby v. Rageh, 178 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 905 (1949)
(conviction affirmed where counsel failed to discover the invalidity of prior conviction
and defendant was sentenced under the habitual criminal statute); Diggs v. Welch,
148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied 325 U.S. 889 (1945) (new trial denied
though it was shown that questionable advice had been given the defendant regarding
his plea of guilty).
The showing of incompetence must be clear and conclusive. See Diggs v. Welch,
supra; Bostic v. Rives, 107 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied 309 U.S. 664 (1940).
Incompetence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily give the
defendant grounds for new trial on the theory that the acts of the attorney are imputed
to his client. Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied 324 U.S. 869
(1945). But where the defendant is ignorant of his rights and the attorney acts negligently or improperly the result may be different. Coates v. Lawrence, .upra. This
exception would appear to be reasonable if the ultimate concern is a "fair trial." Compare this last position with the contentions of the Court in DeMeerleer v. Michigan
and Uveges v. Pennsylvania, supra note 7.
0 U.S. ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 1949).
10 See note 8 supra. In a recent case the application of the standard set out in U.S.
ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, supra note 9, might have brought a different result. The
counsel was court-appointed; trial was held 24 hours later; counsel made no motion
for continuance though he had requested more time during an in-chambers conference;
an affidavit appeared in the record to the effect that he had never tried a case; the
conviction for pimping -and procuring was affirmed. Lewis v. Territory of Hawaii,
210 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1954).
11 State v. Hartwig, 36 Wn.2d 598, 219 P.2d 564 (1950) (trial was set for the same
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counsel is obviously impaired by limitation on time allowed for preparation, no matter how competent the attorney.
In the instant case the court-appointed counsel was a recent law
school graduate and had been admitted to the bar within the year prior
to the trial. There is no denying the proposition that the age or inexperience of counsel should not, in itself, provide grounds whereby criminal offenders could expect to gain respite but circumstances in an individual case may show deprivation of due process safeguards. I The
initial responsibility for observance of those safeguards rests with the
trial judge."3 Technically, the defendant here was not denied the right
to counsel and the machinery of justice moved at an accelerated speed
by his own agreement and direction, but the total circumstances present
a close question. "

Fluoridation of City Water Supply Constitutional. Washington
has joined the growing list of jurisdictions upholding city ordinances
providing for fluoridation of city water supplies. The Washington court,
5 rejected the arguments that the city's
in Kaul v. City of Chetalis,"
action was ultra vires its statutory power to provide "water," that there
was an invasion of the appellant's constitutional rights and that fluoridation was compulsory mass medication. Four other jurisdictions have
rejected the same arguments; the U.S. Supreme Court has either
denied certiorari or dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.' Little can be gained from dissecting the majority arguments or
day counsel was to appear in the supreme court; the trial court denied a continuance
and court-appointed counsel, designated 45 minutes before trial, was denied a continuance; conviction was reversed); U.S. v. Helwig, 159 F2d 616 (3rd Cir. 1949) (courtappointed counsel was designated a few minutes before trial; held, right to effective
counsel had been denied) ; Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943).
12 145 Wash. Dec. at 117, 273 P.2d at 499 (dissenting opinion).
"I Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949);
State v. Bourse ........
Ore..........
264 P2d 800, 804-805 (1953).
14 The dissent pointed up the unusual circumstances involved here. "The unique
aspect of the petitioner's case lies in the failure of his court-appointed counsel to insist
upon adequate time to prepare the case, in counsel's actual agreement to the early trial
date, and petitioner's apparentconsent to such procedure. In essence, in a case involving
the possibility of a sentence of life imprisonment, defense counsel, having only a part of
Friday and th ... week-end to investigate and consider the matter, at his client's
request, agreed to present no defense, save the petitioner's own denial of guilt. In one
of his affidavits ...defense counsel stated: 'I believe that I did the best job possible
although had I known then what I know now I would have conducted it differently.'
145 Wash. Dec. at 115, 273 P2d at 498499. The defendant refused to allow his counsel
to use the defense of "frame-up" on the part of the wife because he hoped for a reconciliation with her after the trial; she subsequently divorced the defendant and remarried.
145 Wash. Dec. at 110, 273 P.2d at 496.
15 145 Wash. Dec. 575, 277 P2d 352 (1954).
16 DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal.App2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied 347 U.S.
1012 (1954) ; Kraus v. City of Cleveland, ........
Ohio N.P......
116 N E2d 779 aff'd.
........
Ohio St ..........
121 N.E.2d 311 (1954) ; Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859,
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the counter arguments of the three separate dissents in the Kaul case;
the extensive treatment given the subject by the members of the Washington court provides a well documented discussion. Excellent notes
have appeared in recent periodicals.17
The Washington decision warrants- additional consideration because
of two sidelights to the decision itself. First, the court was divided, five
to four, the closest division of any jurisdiction thus far facing the
issue. 8 Three of the four dissenters in the Kaul case had joined with the

majority in an earlier Washington case upholding compulsory X-ray
of university students.' In that case the issue was basically one of
restriction of individual freedom to act or not to act in the exercise of
religious belief as opposed to regulation for the protection of society
in general. While no question of religious freedom was raised in the
instant case, Judge Hill, referring to the X-ray case in his dissent, said:
"We were meticulously careful . . . to make it clear that no specific
treatment was prescribed by the regulation there in question." He
added: "Up to now, the basis for the restriction of liberty of the indiwould not be permitted to jeopardize the health
vidual has been that he
' 20
and safety of others.
The general proposition would seem to be that if there is a legitimate
public health object sought, and the means employed bear a reasonable
relation to that end, the courts will approve the legislative exercise of
the police power.2 With fluoridation the object is the prevention of
dental caries; the addition of fluorides to the public water supply is
declared to bear a reasonable relation to that end. No court has.indi74 So2d 142 (1954), dism"ised for want of substantial federal question 348 U.S. 892
(1954); Dowell v. City of Tulsa ......... Okla ......... 273 P.2d 859 (1954), cert. denied
75 Sup. Ct. 292 (1955).
17 4 HASTINGS L. J. 1 (1952) (a discussion of the legal prospects of fluoridation in
California prior to the first decided case, DeAryan v. Butler, supra note 16); 20
BnooimYx L. 1. 298 (1954) (a discussion of the DeAryan case, noting the court's
rejection of the appellant's claim that a present danger must exist before a health
measure may be sustained) ; 5 CATu. U. L. R. 110 (1955) (a discussion of the DeAryan
case, Kraus v. City of Cleveland, supra note 16, and Chapman v. City of Shreveport,
supra note 16; the author indicates the limited force of the argument that fluoridation
measurably affects only children under the age of 12 and so is for a special class, saying
that the whole community will ultimately be benefited since the children will retain the
effects throughout their adult lives); 7 ALA. L. REv. 145 (1954) (the note author
attacks the decision in the Kraus case, supra, on the ground that such a police measure
denies the individual's right to treat his health as he deems best; it should be noted
that a similar argument was rejected in the cases where raised); 23 GEO. WAsH. L.
REv. 343 (1955) (an extensive survey of the medical as well as legal aspects of fluoridation, reviewing the cases cited in note 16, supra.)
28 Of the four cases cited in note 16, supra, only in the Chapman case was there a
dissent and the dissenting opinion is not reported.
-19 State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wn.2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
20 145 Wash. Dec. at 589, 277 P2d at 361.
2123 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 343, 357 (1955).
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cated how far the general proposition might be extended. If medical
science should discover a drug for the prevention of cancer, could a
city, in the exercise of its police power, add that drug to the water
supply? A good affirmative argument could be made on the basis of
the fluoridation cases. We are past the point of protecting society from
the possible dangers of uncontrolled non-conformity.2 2 The individual
must accept treatment for dental caries even though his rejection of
such treatment, were he free to choose, would injure him alone. If the
appellant in the instant case had prevailed the other members of the
community would be in no worse danger from his non-conformity than
they would be if fluorine treatment had never been discovered. The
courts may well be faced with the problem in the future of how far the
state may go in the treatment of physical ills; it may even be a question
of extension of the police power to the point of paternalism.
The second interesting sidelight on the Kaul case is the manner in
which the fluoridation was effected. The Chehalis City Council passed
an ordinance calling for the addition of fluorides to the water supply.
In some instances fluoridation has come via the ballot box but the
resistance has been strong.24 Of course, council action may be subjected
to test by ballot.25 So the situation is presented where pro-fluoridation
forces have come away from the courts triumphant but have met with
less than resounding success at the polls."SAMUEL F. PEARCE
Constitutional Law-Location of Executive Agency Offices at the Seat of Government.- In a mandamus action by four private citizen-taxpayers and a domestic
corporation of the state the court was asked, in State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, 145
Wash. Dec. 107, 273 P.2d 464 (1954), to compel the governor and the individual heads
22 This refers to those cases involving vaccination and other health measures. Zucht
v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 187 U.S. 174 (1905) ; State
ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, supra note 19.
23 The city of Chehalis has but a single water supply and the appellant as pointed
out in the dissent, is left with the alternatives of shipping in untreated water for his
consumption, not using water or moving from the city. In some instances the existence
of an alternative water supply in the area would weaken the argument. It must be
admitted that the appellant's refusal to drink fluoridated water or to take other treatment for dental caries will injure no one but himself since the disease is not contagious.
The suggestion that each individual could fluoridate his own water on a voluntary
basis has not been accepted. Dowell v. City of Tulsa, supra note 16.
24 According to the Washington State Department of Public Health six cities in
Washington have rejected fluoridation when it was put to a vote; three have approved.
25 Charter of City of Seattle, adopted March 12, 1946, as amended in 1948 and 1950,
Art. IV, §1, H. RCW 35.22.200. RCW 35.17.240. These statutory and charter provisions concern the recognition of the referendum as a legislative device.
26 A recent example is the city of San Diego, California. Its fluoridation ordinance
was upheld in DeAryan v. Butler, note 16 supra. On June 8, 1954 the electorate voted
to stop fluoridation, 49,976 to 41,382. Bulletin No. 748 (Citizens' Medical Reference
Bureau, Inc., N.Y. 1954).
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of thirteen executive agencies to move the offices of those agencies from Seattle to
Olympia, the state capital. Affirming the lower court's action in overruling a demurrer
to the petition, the court, in a five to four decision, held: (1) In the absence of a
statute governing taxpayers' suits a demand on the proper officer to take action is a
condition precedent to the maintenance of a taxpayer's action challenging the validity
of what public officers have done or are about to do, unless facts are alleged which
show such a demand would have been useless; (2) the courts of the state have jurisdiction to determine questions of the location of the seat of government; (3) the Governor should be dismissed as a respondent because the result of the order directed to
the heads of the agencies will be the same whether the Governor is a party or not, the
court declining to decide whether mandamus will lie to the Governor; (4) the state
constitutional provision for the location of the executive departments of the state,
Article III, § 24, in the light of the congressional enabling act and the historical background of the territorial laws, requires the location of the whole of the executive department at the seat of government. The dissent contended that since these executive
agencies existing subsequent to the passage of the constitution were created by the
legislature, the legislature, in the absence of limitation, has the power to locate the
offices of these agencies and that such location is a political, not a constitutional
question. See also Equity at page 138.

CONTRACTS
Quasi .Contractual Remedy in Unjust Enrichment - Cause of
Action. The problem of the quasi-contractual remedy for unjust enrichment was raised in Mill & Logging Supply Co. v. West Tenino
Lumber Co.1 One Herrington had been operating a lumber mill in
Tenino under the name of Herrington Lumber Mill Co. and since 1939
had been regularly supplied with tools and machinery by the plaintiff
and its assignors. On November 23, 1948, he executed a bill of sale for
his mill to the Thurston County Investment Co., a co-partnership,
which in June 1949 transferred the mill to the defendant. Both of these
transfers were unknown to the plaintiff. Herrington continued to hold
himself out as the owner, doing business under the old firm name and
the plaintiff went on doing business with him as before. In March 1950
a receiver was appointed for the Herrington Lumber Mill Co. and the
plaintiff learned for the first time about the change in ownership. The
plaintiff brought this action to recover the value of the machines and
tools supplied on credit. The complaint failed to allege the relation between Herrington and the defendant. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and dismissed the action. On appeal the court
reversed and remanded the cause for a trial on the merits as to that
part of the indebtedness which was incurred since the transfer of the
title to the defendant. The decision, following the pleadings of the
144 Wn.2d 102, 265 P2d 807 (1954). See also Corporationsat page 109.

